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Abstract:  Differences in group affiliation may affect the level of cooperation in global 
commons situations such as programs for the conservation of resources which generate 
benefits that transcend state boundaries.  We design a real-time, cross-cultural common pool 
resource (CPR) experiment purposely using participants from cultures that derive different 
benefits from biodiversity (extraction versus conservation) to analyze the effect of group 
affiliation on cooperative behavior.  In addition, we elicit real donations to local and 
international conservation funds to augment our CPR results.  In the CPR environment, we 
find evidence that group affiliation affects behavior such that heterogeneity contributes to 
over-extraction in the commons.  In the donation stage, we show that nationality affects the 
distribution of donated earnings between the local and global funds.  We also examine the 
possibility that altruistic preferences to donate to a conservation fund are endogenous, in 
that they reflect the level of cooperation in the CPR game. 
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The conservation of biodiversity for the global community and for local users can be 
modeled as a multi-level social dilemma. On the level typically studied, the success of 
conservation depends directly on the solution of local commons dilemmas among rural users 
whose livelihoods come from extracting natural resources in rich ecosystems. However, to 
achieve a socially desirable outcome at the global level, preserving biodiversity also requires 
cooperation between outsiders and local users who both benefit from the commons 
economically (e.g. extracting productive resources) and in non-market-oriented ways (e.g. 
oxygen production and species preservation).  
  Global-level cooperation is complicated by the fact that local users benefit mainly 
from extraction, while outsiders have begun to realize that they benefit, on aggregate, mostly 
from the non-market aspects of rainforests. As a result, many of the difficulties arising in 
international negotiations are derived from different perceptions (North vs. South) about the 
rights and responsibilities of each side regarding the use of these ecosystems (Buck [1998]). 
Keohane and Ostrom [1995] highlight shared concerns of the international relations and 
local common pool resource (CPR) literatures, one of which is the problem of heterogeneity 
among actors: ￿While the assumption of homogeneity was made for theoretical simplicity, it has been 
regarded for too long as sufficiently close to reality to be able to be used as a basis for policy analysis, despite 
the fact that heterogeneity is a prominent aspect of both CPR and IR situations.￿(1995:6-7). They 
suggest that heterogeneities of capabilities, preferences, information, and beliefs are 
important determinants of cooperation in commons dilemmas.  In the same volume, Martin 
[1995] and Snidal [1995] draw attention to the problems of heterogeneous preferences and 
differing preference intensities, and Oye and Maxwell [1995] and Mitchell [1995] provide 
examples.  Particularly relevant, Snidal illustrates the issue of differing interests by writing, 
￿But when distributional issues are important because states have different interests - for example, if they have 
differences over which public good should be provided ... - then heterogeneous preferences inhibit cooperation.￿ 
(1995:64).  
  Many positions remain polarized by different views of who has the right to benefit 
from extracting biodiversity resources, who should pay for conservation, and who should 
bear the opportunity costs of either conserving or transforming forested land for agriculture. 
Colombia and the U.S. represent countries on different sides of the issue. Colombia 
represents those countries that host much of the world￿s biodiversity, while being a primary 
beneficiary of its direct use and extraction. At the same time, the U.S. benefits mostly from 
conservation (non-extraction).  Since Colombia and the U.S. have different interests with 
respect to the problem of preserving biodiversity in the global context, we are interested in 
examining, in a controlled experimental setting, how constituents of these countries, when  
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primed with a commons situation, behave given any incongruous attitudes towards 
conservation.  Because naturally arising group affiliations are our only manipulation, we 
assign behavioral differences to participants￿ perceptions of themselves and of other actors 
in the global conservation dilemma.  Specifically, we study how people from the U.S. and 
Colombia behave when facing a commons dilemma, to see whether group composition (all 
U.S., all Colombian, or mixed) matters.  To supplement our group composition analysis we 
also allow participants to donate their earnings from the commons stage to three actual 
conservation funds.  The donation stage is motivated by two rationales: actual donations 
may test and extend the external validity of the commons experiment and we can test the 
extent to which prior cooperation (or the lack there of) affects donations.  
  Related work on social dilemmas, group organization and group cohesiveness forms 
the basis for our experiment and informs our priors about behavior in our experiment.  
There are two classes of results one can read in this literature that are important for our 
purposes.  First, group affiliation appears to be a robust determinant of cooperativeness in 
social dilemmas, but pre-existing affiliations affect behavior much more than artificial or 
manipulated affiliations.  For example, Kollock [1998] demonstrates that fraternity brothers 
subjectively transform social dilemmas into games with multiple Pareto-ranked equilibria 
when playing with other brothers, but seek to exploit students from a rival school or the 
campus police.  Further, Kramer and Brewer [1984] in a common pool resource setting find 
that location, another determinant of identity brought to the lab (and our main treatment 
variable), affects cooperativeness between groups.  However, Eckel and Grossman [2001] 
show that simply assigning otherwise homogeneous participants to groups and using an 
innocuous method to identify groups is not enough to foster group identity.  In another 
treatment, however, they show that a common history of cooperation in one task builds 
group cohesion and translates into more cooperation in a team production experiment. 
  When group affiliation matters, it tends to play one of two roles.  As documented in 
Kollock [1998], group affiliation changes one￿s subjective characterization of the material 
payoffs to interactions depending on whether one plays with an ingroup member or 
someone from an outgroup (especially if the outgroup is perceived as hostile).  Simply put, 
people play assurance games with ingroup members and prisoners dilemma games with 
outgroup members.  This phenomenon is also discussed in Komorita and Lapworth [1982] 
who show that ingroups foster cooperation, while the presence of an outgroup triggers 
competition among subgroups in an N-person prisoners dilemma.  Similarly, ingroups often 
use outgroups as scapegoats for the lack of internal cooperation.  Recently, Schmitt et al. 
[2000] conducted a series of CPR experiments in which two out of the eight players were 
excluded from group communication before each round. Such restricted communication 
created difficulties for increasing cooperation and social efficiency because groups found it  
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difficult to reach and adhere to agreements.  The existence of outsiders benefiting from the 
cooperation of those agreeing created more suspicion about outsiders￿ intentions; further, 
this setting created strategic opportunities for some players to free-ride and expect the group 
to blame the outsiders.  
  Despite the variety of basic research done on the role of naturally occurring group 
affiliations in solving social dilemmas, our work is unique in that we test whether preexisting 
affiliations affect behavior in a particular situation of economic and political interest, 
conserving a common pool resource.  Basing our prior expectations on the results of the 
above experiments, we anticipated that our naturally occurring group manipulation (i.e. one￿s 
actual relationship with a global commons) would affect cooperative behavior.  But, the 
magnitudes of the effects, their directions, and whether the effects would persist outside of 
the hypothetical CPR experiment (i.e. would they also affect real donations) were interesting 
questions so far unanswered in the literature. 
A summary of our findings is as follows.  In the CPR environment, we find 
evidence that group affiliation affects behavior.  American students maintain their extraction 
in the mixed treatment (both Colombian and American participants) compared to 
homogeneous groups (i.e. American participants only), while Colombian participants extract 
more in the mixed treatment.  We also witness negative reciprocity by exploited subgroups.  
Here subgroups that extract less in one period (i.e. are exploited) tend to extract more in the 
future, and the magnitude of this adjustment is determined by participant nationality and our 
treatments.  In the donation stage, we find that heterogeneity with respect to conservation 
attitudes does exist by nationality and that these attitudes affect how much participants are 
willing to donate their earnings to different conservation funds.  We also examine the 
possibility that altruistic preferences to donate to a conservation fund are endogenous, in 
that they reflect the level of cooperation in the CPR game. 
 
2 Experimental  Design 
 
Using current internet technology, we were able to run real-time experiments in which half 
our participants were students from a private Colombian university in BogotÆ, and half were 
students in the U.S. at a private college in Middlebury (Vermont). We also conducted 
sessions with homogeneous groups of Colombian and American students to control for base 
levels of cooperativeness in the two cultures.  Each experimental session was split into three 
parts: a CPR game, a dictator game, and a survey.  Players were not told there would be a 
dictator game when participating in the CPR game, so we can assume that any 
cooperativeness demonstrated in the CPR stage is independent of anticipated altruism in the 
second stage, but the reverse is not true.  In fact, we counted on the possibility that players￿  
  5
experiences in the CPR game would partially determine their behavior in the dictator game. 
 
2.1 Stage I - The CPR Game 
Our CPR experiment is similar to the one used by Cardenas [2003], which was initially based 
on the experiments discussed in Ostrom et al. [1994].  Similar to Ostrom et al. [1994], the 
design maintains the incentive structure of a non-linear commons extraction problem with a 
symmetric Nash strategy that is not dominant. However, we preferred the payoff function 
used by Cardenas because it includes an element that motivates this research.  Specifically, 
non-use benefits of a common pool resource also accrue to players when there is no 
extraction from the CPR.  These benefits represent the indirect benefits, such as biodiversity 
preservation, clean air or the prevention of erosion, discussed above. 
  The payoff function is based on a simple model of a fixed number of homogenous 
agents that benefit from both the extraction of a forest for which there is joint access and 
from the externalities that flow from the conservation of the forest. In each round of the 
game, each player is given an endowment of effort, e,  that can be allocated between 
extracting resources - which increases individual benefits from extraction but decreases 
group benefits from conservation - and providing labor to an unrelated activity that yields 
private marginal benefits. 
 Let  xi denote the amount of time individual i spends collecting resources from the 
forest, and let w denote the marginal return on effort not allocated to extraction. Then, i￿s 
decision to provide (e - xi) units of labor to the private alternative yields a payoff of w(e - xi). 
Effort spent extracting from the forest yields a private benefit, which we assume takes the 
non-linear form g(xi) = ( xi - N(xi)2 /2, where ( and N are strictly positive and are chosen in 
part to guarantee g(xi) > 0, for xi 0 [1, e]. The strict concavity of g(xi) indicates diminishing 
marginal private returns to extraction. 
  In the case of the group externality from aggregate extraction, individual payoffs 
decrease with 3xi because, for instance, biodiversity or water regulation benefits diminish 
for all group members. We can assume then that q is a quadratic function of the aggregate 
amount of time individuals in the group spend collecting resources; specifically, q(3xj) = q0 - 
(3xi)2  /2, where q0 is interpreted to be biodiversity or water quality in the absence of 
extraction. Again these parameters are chosen so that q(3xi)  > 0 for all feasible 3xi. 
 Define  u(xi,  3xi) to be the sum of the sources of utility for an individual that 
exploits the forest. Parameters were chosen, in part, to guarantee that u(xi, 3xi) > 0 for all 
possible xi and 3xi. To facilitate scaling individual payoffs, we take an individual￿s payoff 
function to be a positive, monotonic transformation F of u. In particular, F(u) =k(u)
0, where 
k and 0 are all positive constants. An individual￿s payoff function is then  
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Ui(xi, 3xi) = k[(q
o-(3xi)
2/2) + ((xi - N(xi)
2/2) + wiH(e-xi)]
0                                     [1] 
 
  Each group consisted of n = 8 subjects, and each subject was allocated e = 8 units of 
time in each round. As in Cardenas [2003] we choose parameter values: k=0.0024, 0=2, 
qo=1372.8,  (=97.2,  N=3.2, wi=30,  and e=8. Individual payoffs were therefore calculated 
from the payoff function: 
 
Ui(xi, 3xi) = 0.00024[(1372.8 - (3xi)
2/2) + (97.2 xi - 3.2(xi)
2/2) + 30H(8-xi)]
2          [2] 
 
  All subjects were given the same table of payoffs (see the appendix), which listed 
how much they would earn as a function of their choices and the choices of the other group 
members.  Because extracting resources generates a public bad (here lower biodiversity or 
water quality), standard theory predicts that purely self-interested individuals will spend more 
time harvesting resources than is socially optimal. Indeed, one common reference point for 
experiments of this type is the one-shot, complete-information Nash equilibrium, and 
another is the outcome at which group welfare is maximized. Since players￿ payoffs are 
identical, we only discuss symmetric individual choices. Let x denote the common amount 
of time each individual spends extracting in any symmetric outcome. Using [1], the joint 
welfare function is W(x) = n(k)[(q0 - (nx)2 /2) + ((x - N(x)2/2) + w(e - x)]
0 . The first-order 
condition for the maximization of W(x) requires -xn2 +  ( - Nx ￿ w = 0. Solving for x and 
substituting the actual parameter values yields optimal individual amounts of time spent 
extracting, x* = (( - w)/(N + n2 ) = 1. That is, if all eight players choose 1 month in the 
forest, the Pareto optimal solution is achieved. The equivalent conditions for the symmetric 
Nash equilibrium require that xnash = (( - w)/(N + n) = 6. 
  To communicate player decisions back and forth during mixed sessions we used an 
internet messaging program which allowed us to transfer data instantly between Bogota and 
the U.S.  As players entered the classroom in which the experiments were conducted, they 
saw the instant messaging software projected on a screen.  Additionally, they were able to see 
the pre-experiment conversation between the two authors as it happened (e.g. we discussed 
how many participants had shown up).  We projected the screen to assure participants that 
there were four additional participants in the other country.  When a session was ready to 
begin, we turned off the projector to assure that individual choices were anonymous. 
  The CPR stage lasted fifteen rounds (this was common knowledge), and each round 
proceeded as follows.  Players were given small pieces of paper on which they were told to 
write their player numbers, the round number, location, and the number of months they 
wanted to spend extracting from the commons.  The experimenter in each location collected  
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the decision sheets after each round and sent the individual decisions to his counterpart.  
Once the subtotals from each location had been recorded, they became common knowledge, 
as each experimenter wrote the round number, the months spent in the forest by players in 
Bogota, the months spent in the forest by Middlebury players, and the total months spent by 
the entire group on the blackboard.  Although subtotals were spurious information in theory 
(i.e. players only needed the total to calculate payoffs), we recorded these figures to reinforce 
the fact that the commons was split into two subgroups.  Each round was completed when 
the players calculated their earnings and recorded them on their earnings record sheets. 
  To make the protocol for the homogeneous sessions as close to the protocol for the 
mixed sessions as possible, players in the homogeneous sessions were split into two 
subgroups and one subgroup was brought into an adjoining room.  In this case, after players 
made their decisions one experimenter would go to the other room to exchange subgroup 
totals.  When making aggregate extraction decisions public in the homogeneous sessions, 
each experimenter wrote the round, subgroup one￿s months, subgroup two￿s months, and 
the total number of months spent extracting on the board. 
 
Table 1 here 
 
  Table 1 summarizes our design.  At the end of fifteen rounds, players were asked to 
total their payoffs and hand in their earnings record sheets.  All participants faced the same 
payoff table, but they were paid differently per point earned. Colombians were paid 2.5 
Colombian pesos per point earned, while U.S. participants were paid 0.02 cents per point 
earned. At an exchange rate of 2,200 pesos per dollar when we ran the experiments, this 
represents a 9/5 ratio for payments.  This ratio was chosen because we estimated it would 
maintain differences in the purchasing power for these two particular populations of 
students.2  Including the show-up fee, participants in Middlebury received an average of 
$14.70, ranging from $11.00 to $19.00, and their Colombian counterparts received an 
average of $7.88, ranging from $5.45 to $11.82. 
 
2.2 Stage II - The Donation Decision 
In the second stage of each session we allowed participants to voluntarily and anonymously 
donate any portion of their earnings from stage I to three actual biodiversity conservation 
projects (in a way inspired by Eckel and Grossman [1996]).  Each subject was presented with 
two projects, one benefiting the local community and the other benefiting the international 
                                            
2 We estimated the 9/5 ratio based on (1) a typical bundle of recreation expenditures (pizza & beer) 
college students purchase, and (2) typical wages for students on both campuses.  
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community.  In all sessions players could donate to the Nature Conservancy, which is 
involved in international conservation projects.  Additionally, Middlebury players could 
donate to the Vermont Land Trust, which purchases rural land for preservation in Vermont, 
and Bogota players could donate to Fundacion Natura￿s ￿Adopt a Hectare￿ program, which 
accumulates donations to purchase and maintain forested areas in Colombia. 
  One reason we included the second stage was to examine whether a history of 
cooperativeness, and player attitudes towards the other subgroup, influence an actual 
donation decision. In particular, we were interested to see whether the level and distribution 
(local versus international) of contributions would be affected by play in stage I.  Another 
reason to include the second stage was as a check on the external validity of our stage I 
results (particularly if one believes behavior in the two stages is independent).  In stage I, 
although money is at stake, players make conservation decisions in a hypothetical game 
environment and we were curious about whether group affiliations (i.e. being from 
Colombia or from the U.S.) are sufficient to cause behavioral differences.  Therefore, in 
stage II we ask players to directly demonstrate their willingness to pay for conservation. 
  To mitigate the possible confounds of subjects feeling they must contribute and/or 
suspicions that contributions would not actually be sent (as conjectured in Frohlich et al. 
[1997]), we ran stage II carefully.  Subjects were given their final earnings in cash (small 
denomination bills) in a large envelope within which there were two smaller envelopes. They 
were asked, one by one, to go into the hall where they could privately open their packets and 
deposit any amount they wished in two boxes, one for the relevant local conservation 
project and one for the global conservation project.  After making this decision, subjects 
returned to their seats to fill out a short exit survey.  
  While the surveys were being completed, each experimenter counted the donations 
from his or her subgroup.  He then wrote out a check to each of the conservation funds for 
the total amount donated and placed the checks in pre-addressed, stamped envelopes. At the 
end of the session volunteers were asked to bring the envelops, as a group, to mailboxes 
near by (no fewer than two participants per session volunteered to drop the envelopes).  
This procedure was emphasized in the instructions for stage II.  Before the participants left, 
but after everyone had finished the survey, the experimenters exchanged donation 
information and wrote the total donations to the two funds for each subgroup on the 
blackboard. 
 
2.3  Stage III - The Survey 
As mentioned above, the third stage of the experiment asked participants to fill out a survey.  
Participants filled out the survey before knowing how much was donated, in total, to each 
conservation fund to control, as much as possible, for the possible confounding effects of  
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this information.  However, the survey did occur after the CPR segment of the experiment, 
which means that some responses may have been affected by differences in the evolution of 
play across sessions.  Players were asked for basic demographic data (e.g. age, gender) and 
whether players (in the mixed sessions only) believed there were people on the other end of 
the internet connection.3 
 
3 Our  Priors 
 
At the beginning of this project we designed the experiment with the following research 
questions in mind: 
 
(i)  The CPR Decision:  What are the effects of group affiliation on individual extraction 
choices and aggregate social efficiency?  Are there cross-cultural differences in cooperation 
and social efficiency?  Does being in a mixed group change a player￿s willingness to 
cooperate compared to being in a homogeneous group? 
 
(ii)  The Donation Stage:  Are individuals willing to contribute to a conservation project 
that benefits others, locally and internationally?  Does this willingness depend on group 
affiliation? 
 
(iii)  Endogenous Social Preferences vs. Preference Validation: Do players condition donations on 
the cooperativeness of their subgroup and the other subgroup during the CPR stage, or do 
donations correlate with, and therefore validate, initial levels of cooperation in the CPR 
stage? 
 
4 Our  Results 
 
As illustrated in Table 2, on average, our Colombian participants were 22.6 years old, and 52 
percent were female; our American players were 19.47 years old, with 51 percent female.  As 
for perceived levels of cooperativeness in the populations and existing levels of social capital 
(see Putnam [1995]), Middlebury students come from families of 4.49 people, believe 53 
percent of other Middlebury students will sacrifice for the common good, spent 69.37 hours 
last year volunteering in their community, and belonged to 1.81 voluntary organizations, on 
average.  Our representative Colombian student comes from a family with 4.80 members, 
believes 41 percent of his fellow students are cooperative, spent 188.45 hours volunteering 
last year, and belongs to 0.70 volunteer organizations.  We present our choice data in three 
sections that are organized around our research questions. 
                                            
3 On an integer scale from 1 to 5 where 5 meant one completely believed there were players in the 
other country, the average response was 4.80 for Vermonters and 4.25 for Colombians.  
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Table 2 here 
 
4.1  Extraction Choices 
Figure 1 compares the three treatments based on the average subgroup total months spent 
extracting from the commons over the 15 rounds of the experiment. The vertical axis shows 
the average for all subgroups of 4 people. Recall that the Nash equilibrium for any round of 
the game predicts that each player should allocate 6 units of effort (months) to extraction 
and therefore a subgroup should allocate 24 units. Using this figure we can graphically 
analyze differences in behavior between our two homogeneous treatments, between 
nationalities in the mixed treatment, and between our homogenous treatments and the 
corresponding subgroups of the mixed treatments.  Overall, we see that players extract less 
than the Nash prediction in each treatment, but players in the mixed treatment approach the 
equilibrium extraction level by the end of the game.  Further, without statistical tests, the 
biggest difference in behavior appears to be between homogeneous Colombian players and 
their counterparts in the mixed treatment, with the latter extracting noticeably more.  We 
now highlight the major results from the CPR stage. 
 
Figure 1 here 
 
Result 1 - Players Show Restraint: Splitting participants into subgroups should be an 
innocuous change in the design, and it is for homogeneous groups.  Overall, participants 
show restraint with respect to the symmetric Nash prediction (months = 6), but there are 
differences in restraint by treatment. 
 
  To begin, splitting homogeneous groups into two subgroups does not affect 
behavior in either location.  We compared levels of extraction between our homogeneous 
Middlebury treatment to a further control session we ran with Middlebury students in which 
the groups were not divided into subgroups and found no difference in the central tendency 
of behavior (Wilcoxon z=1.35, p=0.18) nor in the distribution of extraction decisions 
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov ks=0.18, p=0.25).  The same was true for Colombian students 
(z=0.88, p=0.38; ks=0.09, p=0.31).4  
  According to game theory, we would also expect no differences in behavior by 
treatment.  Table 3 presents summary statistics for the subgroup total months chosen by the 
participants in our three treatments.  Rather than being the same, the means can be ordered 
                                            
4 Note, these comparisons were made based on individual level data, but for the statistical tests 
discussed in the remainder of the CPR section the level of analysis was the subgroup.   
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as follows: BogMixed > Middlebury > MiddMixed > Bogota.  Further, tests on the data 
pooled across rounds (line 6) show that the central tendency of behavior in each treatment is 
significantly below the theoretic prediction that subgroup months equal 24.  However, this 
result must be tempered by tests limited to the last period only (last line of table 3).  In 
period 15 only the MiddMixed data and the Bogota homogeneous data are significantly 
below the theoretic level, while the Middlebury homogeneous data and the BogMixed can 
not be differentiated from the Nash prediction.  
 
Table 3 here 
 
Result 2 - Southern Resistance: Colombian players react to the mixed treatment by 
significantly increasing their levels of extraction. 
 
  If our framing of the CPR problem is salient and our participants bring 
preconceived notions of each other regarding conservation to the experiment, we expected 
Colombian players would resist Americans, who stereotypically demand more restraint with 
respect to deforestation.  Resistance and defiance in this case would be demonstrated by 
increasing extraction, despite the implications for social welfare.  That is, if resistance 
motivates players, we expect Colombians to increase extraction compared to the control 
treatments and compared to Americans. 
Table 4 presents evidence from Wilcoxon and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicating 
southern resistance.  First, the mixed treatment has a significant effect on Colombian 
participants, who increase their extraction compared to the homogeneous Colombian 
control.  Second, we see that extraction is significantly higher in the Bogota mixed groups 
than in Middlebury mixed groups.5 
 
Result 3 - Northern Restraint: Players from the United States do not react as strongly to 
the mixed treatment in that they do not reduce extraction compared to the baseline, but they 
do extract less than Colombian players in the mixed treatment. 
 
  As with result 2, one might expect American students to show more restraint in the 
mixed treatment if preconceived notions about rainforest conservation influence choices.  
However, returning to table 4 we see only limited support for this hypothesis.  Although 
extraction falls between the homogeneous and mixed treatments for Americans (table 3), the 
difference is not significant (table 4).  But we do see that American players extract 
significantly less than Colombian players in the mixed treatment. 
                                            
5 These differences persist at the 1% level if we look at the last five periods only.  
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Table 4 here 
 
Results 2 and 3 suggest that group affiliation affects participant decisions.  Therefore, we 
now examine the effect of splitting groups into two subgroups and how creating subgroups 
might interact with group affiliations to generate conflict in our experimental commons.  We 
define subgroup exploitation in the following way.  In each session, there are two subgroups 
extracting from the same commons.  Calculate the level of extraction for each subgroup and 
then find the difference.  We say that one subgroup exploits the other when it extracts more.  
To control for the overall level of extraction, we divide by the sum of the subgroup 
extraction levels.  Hence, where i and j are the two subgroups in each session, we define -1≤ 













Result 4 - Subgroup Exploitation and Reciprocity: Being exploited causes subgroups to 
increase extraction, but exploiting others does not cause subgroups to reduce extraction. 
 
  To assess whether subgroups reacted to exploitation, we calculated our index for 
each treatment and for each period (note: positive EXP means your subgroup was exploited 
and negative means your group exploited the other subgroup) and then regressed the 
difference in subgroup extraction between period t and period t-1 on the exploitation index 
in period t-1.  Overall, we found great differences in the response, depending on whether a 
subgroup was exploited or was the exploiter.  To give the reader a sense of the relationship 
between exploitation and extraction, Figure 2 presents a scatter plot of all three treatments 
pooled annotated by the regression lines for the exploiters (EXP≤0) and the exploited 
(EXP≥0).  Considering the reaction of the exploited first, the coefficient on the lagged 
exploitation regressor is 15.21 and, like all the separate treatment regressors, is significant at 
the one percent level.6  This indicates that moving from not being exploited to being fully 
exploited (e.g. from sharing the commons to extracting nothing) causes exploited subgroups 
to increase their collective extraction by an average of 15.21 months or 3.8 months per 
subgroup member, resulting in a level nearly double the average extraction.  
 
                                            
6 Further, neither the intercept for exploiters nor the intercept for the exploited is significant at the 
five percent level.  
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Figure 2 here 
  
  However, as seen in figure 2, the relationship between exploitation and extraction is 
clearly kinked.  The pooled coefficient for the exploiters is not significant (p=0.57), and 
small, (beta=1.6).  This suggests that exploiting subgroups are just as likely to continue 
exploiting as they are to reduce extraction in the next period.  In terms of reciprocity, 
pooling across treatments, our participants demonstrate strong negative reciprocity (i.e. they 
increase their extraction when exploited), but show no positive reciprocity (i.e. they don￿t 
reduce extraction when the other subgroup does).  Further, this kink occurs at the origin, as 
indicated by the fact that the intercepts are not significant on either side of EXP=0. 
 
Result 5 - Group Affiliation Exacerbates the Relationship between Exploitation and 
Reciprocity: Exploitation in the mixed treatment elicits more negative reciprocity than in 
the homogeneous treatments.  In particular, Colombians react more aggressively towards 
American exploitation than towards being exploited by other Colombians. 
 
Figure 3 charts the coefficients of positive reciprocity (i.e. the coefficients on the lagged 
exploitation variable when EXP<=0) and negative reciprocity (i.e. EXP>=0) for our two 
homogeneous treatments and for the two components of our mixed treatment.  We use a 
bar chart to facilitate comparisons.  As with the pooled data, none of the coefficients of 
positive reciprocity is large or significantly different from zero.  These coefficients suggest 
that in each treatment subgroups do not feel guilty about extracting more than the other 
subgroup, nor do they tend to reduce extraction in the future.  By comparison, negative 
reciprocity is a strong motivator in each treatment (all coefficients are significant at the one 
percent level), and there is an interesting trend when comparing the size of the effect across 
treatments.  First, comparing our homogeneous treatments, we see almost no difference 
between the size of the negatively reciprocal response in the two homogeneous groups 
(compare 15.47 to 15.86).  Second, the response of Colombians to exploitation nearly 
doubles when the exploiters are American, while the American coefficient only increases 
mildly (from 15.86 to 16.77) when interacting with Colombians.  We conclude that negative 
reciprocity within our two cultures is equally strong, but, in line with our hypothesis 
concerning possible north vs. south attitudinal divisions, Colombians show much more 
negative reciprocity towards Americans than American show towards Colombians7. 
 
                                            
7 Given that the students of each campus have hardly heard of the other particular school, and in the 
framing we made explicit the location in terms of country rather than school, we discard the 
possibility of this being an effect of campus competition.  
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Figure 3 here 
 
 
4.2  Donation Decisions 
Because our protocol does not allow participants to identify each other￿s donations (i.e. they 
only learn the total given by their subgroup), we control for possible effects of peer pressure 
or approval.  Therefore, only a sense of individual responsibility for the environment can 
explain positive donations. Some may argue that the positive donations might happen just 
because the money involved was received from participating in this experiment, and not 
earned from any real effort. However, we note that positive donations to public goods 
outside of controlled experiments is not uncommon8.  
Two broad questions organize our discussion of donations. First, do people actually 
donate part of their earnings?  Second, if they do, does individual behavior (cash donated to 
the forest conservation funds) differ between treatments and nationalities?  In general, both 
questions are answered affirmatively. 
 
Result 6 - Donations are Positive:  Overall, the 120 participants donated $322, 24% of the 
total earnings from stage 1. $156 went to the local funds (Vermont Land Trust and 
Fundacion Natura), and $166 went to the international Adopt an Acre program organized by 
The Nature Conservancy. 
 
  Table 5 summarizes our donation data.  Recall that we purposely controlled for 
differences in purchasing power, but this makes our donation analysis more complicated 
because players earn different amounts in the two countries.  For this reason we note that, 
although players tend to earn less in the mixed treatment, the differences are not significant 
(for Middlebury z=0.25, p=0.80; for Bogota z=1.06, p=0.29) and discuss donations as a 
fraction of earnings.  Specifically, we find that average total fractions donated are 
significantly greater than zero in each treatment (p<0.01 for each test).  Further, American 
students, on average, contribute between twenty-four and twenty-seven percent of their 
earnings, and Colombian students donate between eighteen and twenty-five percent of their 
earnings, depending on the treatment.  Lastly, we find no differences in the central tendency 
of total donation percentages between conditions (smallest p-value is 0.14 for the Bogota-
BogMixed comparison), although the distribution of donations between local and 
                                            
8 In a natural experiment on donating to others, Frey and Meier (2002) explore a large dataset of more 
than 96,000 donations by more than 28,000 students at the University of Zurich during a five 
semesters period, who could contribute every semester to funds that provide scholarships to needy or 
foreign students. 68% of people donated to one or more fund.  
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international funds appears to differ by country and treatment. 
 
Table 5 here 
 
Result 7 - Donation Allocations Vary by Nationality and Treatment: Colombian 
students donated proportionally more of their earnings to the local fund, while American 
students donated more to the international fund. 
 
From Table 5 we also observe group affiliation differences in our participants￿ donations.  
For Colombians, of the $100.06 donated, seventy percent is given to the local fund.  This 
trend is reversed for Americans; of the $222 donated, sixty-one percent is given to the 
international fund9.  We proceed by examining behavior in the treatments to better 
understand this difference.  
  In table 6 we test for donation differences by treatment.  There are three 
comparisons to notice.  First, we find evidence of preexisting preference differences for local 
and global conservation.  Comparing the homogeneous Middlebury and Bogota donations, 
we see that the fraction of earnings donated to the local fund is significantly higher in 
Bogota (p=0.05) and that the fraction donated to the international fund is significantly 
higher in Middlebury (p=0.01).  Second, the mixed treatment does not seem to have a 
significant effect on Middlebury students (just like in the CPR stage), but Colombian 
behavior changes when nationalities are mixed.  Notice that neither Middlebury-MiddMixed 
tests are significant, while Colombians give marginally more to the local fund in the mixed 
treatment.  Third, comparing across nationalities in the mixed treatment, we find 
Colombians give significantly more to the local fund than Americans do (p=0.04).  In sum, 
Colombian and American students start with differences in their giving patterns, and these 
differences are exacerbated in the mixed treatment because Colombians donate even more 
locally. 
 
Table 6 here 
 
4.3  The Relationship Between Cooperation and Donations 
Our final research question asks whether players￿ preferences for environmental 
conservation are endogenous to their experiences in the CPR game or whether they reflect 
cooperation at the beginning of the CPR game.  These questions are important because, if 
                                            
9 Interestingly, Frey and Meier (2002) find that foreigners in their sample tend to donate less to the 
scholarship funds, and also that a very minor fraction of students chose to donate to the foreigners 
fund only.  
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previous cooperation in our experiment does affect attitudes towards the environment (i.e. if 
preferences are endogenous), then we can say something about the importance of 
cooperative outcomes for the future success or failure of global conservation agreements.  
Similarly, if donations correlate with early play, we can have more confidence in the external 
validity of the CPR game. 
 
Result 8 - Donations are Correlated with Cooperation: Participants who extracted more 
at the beginning of the CPR stage donated less of their earnings (in three of the four 
treatments).  However, the negative relationship between extraction and donations is 
stronger when considering extraction at the end of the CPR game. 
 
Figures 4a and 4b here 
 
  Figures 4a and 4b provide scatter plots of the relationship between extraction 
decisions and donations.  In each case we use subgroups as the unit of analysis.  The vertical 
axis measures the average fraction of subgroup earnings donated (to either fund), and the 
horizontal axis measures the average individual extraction of the subgroup￿s members for a 
three round period.  Overall, we see a downward sloping relationship for most treatments 
indicating that participants who extracted more in the CPR stage gave less.  In panel (a) 
extraction is the average of the first three periods, which we take as a proxy for base levels of 
cooperativeness, and in panel (b) we measure extraction with the last three rounds.  This 
accounts for the effect of playing the entire CPR game.  Above each plot we report 
Spearman rank order correlations for each treatment.  Interestingly, the correlation between 
donations and extraction is stronger in the first three periods for Middlebury students, but 
the reverse is true for students in Bogota (however the positive early CPR play-donation 
correlation is driven by an outlier).10  This suggests that our American participants returned 
to base levels of cooperativeness when making donations much more than Colombians, who 
conditioned donations on play in the CPR game. 
  While interesting because it shows the strong relationship between donations and 
extraction, the analysis based on figure 4 is incomplete because we can not tell whether 
donations are endogenous to extraction decisions or whether they reflect players￿ base 
propensities to cooperate.  To answer this question we conducted a regression analysis at 
individual level data. 
 
                                            
10 At the individual level, the correlations are much more consistent and significant, but do not 
control for interdependencies in the data.  The Pearson correlation coefficients and p-values for the 
Bogota, Middlebury and Mixed participants were: rhoBOG: = -0.365, p<0.01; rhoMIDD = -0.184, 
p=0.044; rhoMIXED = -0.3084, p<0.01.  
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Result 9 - Donations are Endogenous: : Controlling for other indicators of cooperative 
propensities (e.g. social capital indicators) and personal characteristics (age and gender), 
behavior at the end of the CPR game predicts donations, but behavior at the beginning does 
not. 
 
Table 7 here 
 
  In table 7 we present ordinary least squares regressions (with robust standard errors 
and session fixed effects) to assess whether donations are caused by play in the CPR game or 
reflect player social preferences exemplified at the beginning of the CPR game.  In equation 
(1) we regress the total fraction of one￿s earnings donated on mean individual extraction in 
the first three rounds, mean extraction in the last three rounds and treatment dummies.  This 
first pass suggests that donations are endogenously determined and not simply transported 
from game to game.  In addition, it appears that the different treatments matter only to the 
extent that they generate more or less cooperation (i.e. there seems to be no isolated role of 
nationality).  In equation (2) we add individual characteristics (age and gender) and find 
similar results with two exceptions: older students give significantly more, and Colombians 
playing Colombians tend to give significantly less when compared to Americans playing with 
Americans. 
  We add two things in equation (3), social capital measures (see Putnam [1995], 
Glaeser et al. [1999], and Burks et al. [2003]) as further controls for cooperative propensities, 
and responses to questions about how the experiment was conducted to control for 
confusion and the credibility of the procedures (see Frohlich et al. [1997]).  First, we see that 
the effect of the last three rounds of play is robust to the other measures of cooperativeness, 
as are the effects of age and being a Colombian playing with other Colombians.  We also see 
that standard social capital measures, such as the number of siblings one has, prior altruistic 
acts, and the number of social/volunteer organizations one belongs to, do not predict 
donations, but must correlate with extraction in the first three rounds because the coefficient 
falls by half when they are added.11  In sum, our analysis suggests that donations are 
endogenous to the amount of cooperation that evolves in the CPR game and cannot be 
predicted by initial cooperative acts or other, more standard, measures of social capital. 
 
                                            
11 In fact, regressing mean extraction in the first three periods on the social capital indices and other 
controls suggests the correlations are present but weak.  Only the number of hours one volunteered 
last year significantly predicts initial cooperation at the five percent level.  Additionally, none of the 
other game and conservation related questions mentioned in section 2.3 robustly predict behavior in 




Although local users do a surprisingly good job at creating decentralized institutions to 
regulate the use of common pool resources, global commons problems can be more 
complicated.  Global commons are complicated by additional sources of heterogeneity 
among agents (in addition to their preferences for conservation) which cause the formation 
of ingroups and outgroups that make agreements harder to implement.  For example, the 
Amazonian rainforest not only generates extractive resources for local users, it is also the 
home of much of the world￿s biodiversity.  Colombian users benefit from biodiversity 
conservation but may benefit from extraction more.  At the same time, American users 
benefit primarily from biodiversity conservation.  We hypothesized that this sort of 
difference in preferences, combined with any preconceived notions one group holds of the 
other, may confound the problem of conserving a commons such as the rainforest.   
Specifically, we expected that constituents of a southern country such as Colombia might 
react differently towards conservation when interacting with constituents of a northern 
country, such as the United States, because Colombians gain more from extraction, and 
because Colombians may resist perceived coercion by Americans. 
  In fact, we find evidence supporting both our general heterogeneity hypothesis and 
our specific hypotheses about the interaction of southern and northern countries. In our 
case this heterogeneity in naturally occurring and not induced as in many studies in which 
payoffs are different fro different players.  This common pool resource experiment suggests 
group affiliation matters to different extent to different players.  While our American 
participants do not react much to changes in the composition of the groups, our Colombian 
participants extract significantly more when placed in groups with Americans.  Upon 
analyzing our extraction data more rigorously, we see that a major determinant of the 
Colombian response to group affiliation is that Colombians react nearly twice as much to 
being exploited (extracting less than the other group) by Americans as to being exploited by 
other Colombians.  Finally, when asked to actually donate to the conservation of a forest, we 
find that although overall contribution rates are similar across nationalities, the composition 
of contributions varies considerably.  American participants donate much more to an 
international conservation program, while Colombians donate more to local conservation.  
We feel that these differences in the composition of contributions may reflect differences in 
the way our participants view conservation, in general. 
  Given that our data demonstrate that group affiliation matters, it is important to 
differentiate between the role played by conservation preference differences and the role 
played by ingroup-outgroup mentality.  Our data suggest that both components matter here.  
While extraction levels (table 3) and total donations (table 4) do not differ between our two  
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homogeneous treatments, Colombian donations are skewed toward local conservation and 
American donations are skewed towards global conservation, which means that we can not 
rule out an explanation based on conservation preference differences.  At the same time, 
because our Colombian participants react much more to American exploitation in the CPR 
game and generally increase extraction in the heterogeneous treatment, we suspect that our 
group affiliation manipulation also triggered ingroup-outgroup behavior. It is worth noting 
that the demographic characteristics of the two sub samples gathered in our exit survey seem 
to show that the groups were similar in their backgrounds, beliefs and attitudes towards 
these global commons and regarding cooperation.12  
  We conclude by speculating about how these results may relate to citizens￿ attitudes 
to and support for programs aimed at preserving global commons. Although we recognize 
that parallels made between economic experiments and real world settings with high stakes 
must be viewed with caution, in both our experiment and real world global commons 
decisions are made by individuals whose preferences are determined by some of the factors 
discussed here. Further, many circumstances in which decisions are made and policies are 
designed with implications for global commons conservation depend on preferences of 
individuals and on donations they make. Major funds such as Greenpeace, the Sierra Club, 
or WWF face the type of dilemmas we model and test here.  
There are various implications of our results for the regulation of a global commons. 
First, group affiliation is not innocuous.  Programs for conservation of global commons may 
be affected in at least two ways.  Preference differences with respect to a key issue may 
inhibit agreement rather than opening new dimensions for negotiation.  Further, preexisting 
group affiliation is a strong source of ingroup behavior, which may inhibit agreements 
because cooperation is not tied to issues alone but becomes clouded by other rivalries one 
group feels towards another.  Finally, because our data suggest that social preferences (e.g. 
for conservation) are endogenous to prior interactions, one possibly successful strategy 
would be to break negotiations into a series of steps because establishing a history of 




Thanks to the student donations, three hectares of Andean forest in Colombia were adopted 
through the Fundacion Natura program, almost five acres of tropical forest in Belize were 
                                            
12 Some have speculated whether there could be a ￿Vermont￿ effect given the particular preferences 
of people in this area of the United States towards the environment. However, the variables measured 
as beliefs and attitudes through the exit survey show no significant patterns to support this.  
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adopted through the Nature Conservancy international program and the students purchased 
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8  Appendix - Participant Instructions for the CPR Stage 
 
PAYMENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY 
You have been asked to participate in an experiment. For your participation we have already paid you 
$5. You may receive an additional amount of money depending on your decisions in the experiment. 
This additional amount will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment.  Your  decisions  in 
this experiment and your answers on a survey which we will pass out later will be confidential; none 
of the other participants nor anyone else will ever know the decisions you make or answers you give. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
This experiment attempts to recreate a situation in which a group of individuals must make decisions 
about how to use the resources of, for instance, a forest, a water source, a fishery, or any other 
situation where some group shares a natural resource.  In this experiment, the resource will be 
referred to as the forest.  You will play for 15 rounds, equivalent, for instance, to years or harvest 
seasons. 
  In this experiment the group will be composed of 8 people who are participating today.  You 
will notice that there are only 4 participants in this room.  Currently, there are another 4 participants 
(also college students) in Bogota, Columbia, who will also participate with you today.  We will use the 
internet to transfer information from one location to the other.  Continuing with the forest example, 
you should imagine that the community is made up of two villages, each populated by 4 residents.  
Further, suppose that the two villages are located on opposite sides of the forest.  Now we will 
explain how the experiment will proceed in each round. 
 
THE PAYOFF TABLE 
At the end of the instructions is a PAYOFF TABLE.  This table contains all the information that 
you need to make your decision in each round of the experiment. The numbers inside the table 
correspond to the experimental dollars (E$) that you would earn in each round for a given set of 
decisions.  At the end of the experiment we will translate experimental dollars into real dollars at the 
following rate: $1 =  500 E$.  Recall that there is a total of 8 members in the group (4 people in two 
subgroups).  Each group member has to decide in each round the number of MONTHS that he/she 
wants to allocate to ￿time extracting from the forest￿ (in the columns from 0 to 8). 
  To play in each round, you must write your player ID, your location (in your case this will be 
Middlebury), the current round number, and your decision (a number between 0 and 8) on an 
EXPERIMENT CARD that will be given to you. 
After everyone has made his or her decision, the monitors at each location will collect the 
EXPERIMENT CARDS from the 4 members of each subgroup.  Each monitor will then calculate 
the total months that the subgroup decided to spend extracting from the forest. Next, the two 
monitors will share this information with each other using the internet and then write it on the black 
board for you to see.  The monitors will write the time spent by each subgroup extracting from the 
forest and the total for both subgroups.  When the monitor announces the group total, each of you 
will be able to calculate the payoff that you earned in the round. Let us explain this with two 
examples. 
  In this experiment, we assume that each player has available a maximum of 8 MONTHS to 
work each year extracting a resource like firewood or logs. In the PAYOFF TABLE this corresponds 
to columns 0 to 8. Each member of the group will decide on a number of months from 0 to 8 in each 
round. To calculate your payoff for the round, you also need to know the decisions that the rest in the 
group made. Your payoff in each round will depend on the amount of time you spend in the forest 




MY MONTHS IN THECOMMONS  
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1 619 669 717  764 809 851  890 926 959 
19 488 520 550 578 608 625 645 661 674
20 475 506 535 581 585 606 625 640 653
21 461 491 519 544 567 587 605 619 630
22 447 476 502 527 548 567 584 597 608
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Example 1:  You decide that ￿MY MONTHS IN THE FOREST￿ will be 2. 
 
The monitors collect all the experiment cards and announce that the Bogota subgroup spent 10 
months in the forest and the Middlebury subgroup spent 12 months in the forest.  Therefore, the 
group spent a TOTAL of 22 months in the forest.  Then you know￿ 
 
o  ￿Their months in the forest￿ were     20   . 
o  My E$ earnings for this round are   535  . 
 
Example 1:  You decide that ￿MY MONTHS IN THE FOREST￿ will be 5. 
 
The monitors collect all the experiment cards and announce that the Bogota subgroup spent 14 
months in the forest and the Middlebury subgroup spent 12 months in the forest.  Therefore, the 
group spent a TOTAL of 26 months in the forest.  Then you know￿(Please fill in answers) 
 
o  ￿Their months in the forest￿ were        . 
o  My E$ earnings for this round are         . 
 
THE DECISION FORM 
Now we will discuss how the experiment will proceed in each round.  Each participant has a 
DECISION FORM that is attached to the end of these instructions. 
  We can use Example 1 above to illustrate how to fill in the DECISION FORM. Recall that 
you decided to spend 2 months in the forest this round.  On the EXPERIMENT CARD, you would 
write 2 next to ￿My months in the forest.￿ You must also write this number in the first column (A) of the 
decision form. (You￿re writing your decision down in 2 places: the EXPERIMENT CARD you give 
to the monitor, and the DECISION FORM you keep). 
  The monitors will collect the 4 EXPERIMENT CARDS from each subgroup and will 
calculate the total time spent in the forest by the group. The monitor will announce this total to the 
group.  Recall that in example 1 the total was 22 months.  The Bogota subgroup spent 10 months in 
the forest and the Middlebury subgroup spent 12 months in the forest.  Each of you will write 10 in 
column B of the decision form, 12 in column C, and 22 in column D. 
  To calculate column E, the months spent in the forest by everyone except for you, subtract 
column A from column D (E = D - A).  Then look for the payoff in the PAYOFF TABLE that 
corresponds to ￿MY MONTHS￿￿ = 2, and ￿THEIR MONTHS = 20.￿  You will see a payoff of 
535.  So, in our example, you should have written down: 
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  Column A  Column B  Column C  Column D  Column E  Column F 
Round 
No. 










Months     
(D-A) 
My Payoff 
1 2  10  12 22 20 535 
2      
 
It is very important to clarify that nobody, except for the monitor, will know your decisions in each 
round, or your earnings for the experiment. The only thing announced in public will be the subgroup 
totals and the group total.  These examples are designed to help you understand how the experiment 
will proceed, and how to make your decisions to allocate your MONTHS in each round of the 
experiment.  
Do you have any questions? 
 
MY MONTHS IN THE COMMONS   
  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
0  619 670 719 767 813 856 896 933 967 
1  619 669 717 764 809 851 890 926 959 
2  617 667 714 760 804 845 883 918 950 
3  615 664 711 756 798 838 875 909 940 
4  613 660 706 750 792 831 867 900 929 
5  609 656 701 744 784 822 857 889 917 
6  605 651 695 737 776 813 847 877 905 
7  600 645 688 729 767 808 836 865 891 
8  595 638 680 720 757 792 824 852 877 
9  588 631 672 711 747 780 811 838 862 
10  581 623 663 700 735 768 797 823 846 
11  573 614 653 689 723 755 783 808 830 
12  565 605 642 678 711 741 768 792 813 
13  556 594 631 665 697 726 752 775 795 
14  546 583 619 652 683 711 736 758 776 
15  536 572 606 638 668 695 719 739 757 
16  525 560 598 624 653 678 701 721 737 
17  513 547 579 609 636 661 683 701 717 
18  501 534 565 594 620 643 664 681 696 
19  488 520 550 578 608 625 645 661 674 
20  475 506 535 581 585 606 625 640 653 
21  461 491 519 544 567 587 605 619 630 
22  447 476 502 527 548 567 584 597 608 
23  433 460 485 509 529 547 563 575 585 
24  418 444 468 490 510 527 541 563 561 
25  402 428 451 472 490 506 520 530 538 
26  387 411 433 453 470 485 498 507 514 
27  371 394 415 434 450 464 476 484 490 
28  355 377 396 414 430 443 453 461 466 
29  338 359 378 395 409 421 431 438 442 
30  322 341 359 375 389 400 409 415 418 
31  305 324 341 355 368 378 386 392 394 
32  288 306 322 336 347 357 364 368 371 
33  272 288 308 316 327 335 341 345 347 
34  255 270 284 296 306 314 319 323 324 
35  238 253 266 277 286 298 297 300 300 
36  221 235 247 257 265 272 276 278 278 

































38  189 200 211 219 226 231 233 234 233  
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39  173 184 198 201 206 211 213 213 212 
40  157 167 175 182 188 191 198 198 191 
41  142 151 159 165 169 172 174 173 171 
42  127 135 142 148 152 154 155 154 152 
43  113 120 126 131 134 136 137 136 133 
44  99  106 111 115 118 119 119 118 115 
45  86 92 96  100  102  108  108  101  99 
46  73 78 82 86 87 88 88 86 83 
47  61 66 69 72 73 74 73 71 68 
48  51 54 57 59 60 61 60 58 55 
49  40 44 46 48 49 48 47 45 43 
50  31 34 36 37 33 37 36 34 32 
51  23 25 27 28 28 28 27 25 23 
52  16 18 19 20 20 19 18 17 15 
53  10 12 12 13 13 12 11 10  8 
54  6 7 7 7 7 7 6 5 4 
55  2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 1 
 
56  0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0  
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Exploited Increase
 




















































































MiddMixed (rho=-0.60) Middlebury (rho=-0.36)
BogMixed (rho=0.36)
 





































































MiddMixed (rho=-0.30) Middlebury (rho=-0.08)
BogMixed (rho=-0.56)
 















US-Only  5 40 - 15 
Col-Only 5  -  40  15 
US-Col  5  20 20 15 
Totals  15  60  60  - 





Survey Summary Statistics 
   Bogota  Middlebury   
    Mean  St. Dev.  Mean  St. Dev.  t-Statistic
Age 22.60  4.47  19.47  1.04  5.23 
Female  0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.09 
Years of College  3.72  1.91  1.63  1.03  7.42 
Family Size (excluding 
respondent) 
3.80 1.29 3.49 1.18 1.36 
Volunteered Hours  188.45  487.79  69.37  101.80  1.80 
Demographics 
Membership in Organizations  0.70  1.00  1.81  1.36  5.10 










Subgroup Total Months Extracted 
(data pooled across periods) 
 Middlebury  MiddMixed  BogMixed  Bogota 
min 6.00  8.00  13.00  5.00 
mean  19.25 18.73 20.59 18.39 
median  19.00 19.00 21.00 18.00 
max  32.00 29.00 29.00 30.00 
Std.  Dev.  5.73 4.79 4.16 5.07 
Wilcoxon test (pooled 
mean = 24) 
p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 p<0.01 
Wilcoxon test (last 
period mean = 24) 
p=0.15 p=0.06 p=0.48 p=0.07 





Subgroup Total Months Extracted 
(data pooled across periods) 
 MiddMixed  BogMixed  Bogota 










BogMixed -  -  z=3.34,  p<0.01 
KS=0.27, p<0.01 





























Min  Donation  $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00 




































Individual Donations to Local and International Funds 
(Donations as Percentage of Earnings) 
 MiddMixed  BogMixed  Bogota 










BogMixed -  -  zlocal=1.78, plocal=0.07 
zintl=0.51, pintl=0.61 




Dependent Variable = Total Fraction of Earnings Donated 
  (1) (2) (3) 






































Family Size  -  -  0.013 
(0.017) 
Hours Volunteered Last Year  -  -  0.00002 
(0.00005) 
Number Organizations Belong To  -  -  -0.019 
(0.019) 
Understand Instructions  -  -  0.043 
(0.032) 
Exp. Proceeded According to Instructions  -  -  0.018 
(0.014) 
N  120 120 120 
R2  0.19 0.23 0.24 
F-stat (p-value)  2.12 (0.01)  2.05 (0.01)  1.53 (0.07) 
Notes: All results are OLS with session fixed effects. 
           Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
           *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
           ** significant at the 0.05 level. 
           * significant at the 0.10 level. 
Table 7 - Preference endogeneity or validation? 
 
 
 
 